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There must come a time when water must be apportioned with justice
to all, and a century or more hence we will have it distributed not
upon priority rights, but upon technical rights. We cannot have a
farmer getting more water than he is entitled to, because his greatgrandfather or somebody else happened to secure the water right two
months ahead of somebody else. Water must ultimately be conserved
in the mostjust manner for the general welfare of all citizens.'
-Frederick
Haynes Newell,
Reclamation Service, 1902'
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of United

States

1. The quotation of the language in the Colorado Capitol building was first
utilized by another research work. See Ernest T. Smerdon, Water Conservation in
Irrigated Agriculture, in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES IN WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 160, 163 (Duane D. Baumann & Yacov Y.
Haimes eds., 1988).
t B.B.A., Baylor University, Texas (1997), M.S., Public Policy Analysis, University
of Rochester, New York (1999), J.D. Candidate, University of Denver, Colorado
(2003).
2.

See DoNALDJ. PISANI, WATER, LAND, AND LAw IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC

POLICY, 1850-1920, at 23 (1996).
3. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A century ago, Frederick Newell believed the prior appropriation
system was in need of change. He suggested conservation of water in
4
the most just manner for the welfare of all citizens. More than a
century later, water lawyers and policy analysts sit on the precipice of a
new era, one where conservation in the most just manner no longer
includes increasing available water supply by building large water
storage projects. As other micro-economies illustrate, the most just
manner for the distribution of resources is for users of a resource to
bear the social cost of increasing use, or the marginal social cost. The
goals of water law and policy-that all citizens have access to waterhave not changed in this new era. What has changed is the notion that
humanity's dominance over earth perpetuates an inexhaustible flow of
cheap natural resources.
The title of this analysis, borrowed from the Colorado Capitol's
rotunda, most aptly reflects water law's significance in the West. The
rotunda wall reads: "here is a land where life is written in water." This
analysis suggests that the conditions present in the West at the
founding of the prior appropriation system are different from those
humankind faces today. As such, the assumptions underpinning the
prior appropriation system have changed, while the law has essentially
stagnated. The result is an antiquated system, guarded more with
historical reverence than any argument beyond the protection of
owners' expectations. This analysis, therefore, suggests updating the
prior appropriation doctrine to allow for an economy better able to
achieve Pareto optimality, "a state in which no reallocation of
resources can make anyone better off without making at least one
other person worse off."
Traditional legal analyses typically proceed by defining the present
system and identifying gray areas where creativity could advance a
client's interest. Here, I refer to this concept as the "is" of water law.
Robert E. Beck writes, "too much legal research merely explains the
law as it is, identifies ambiguities and gaps, and suggests solutions
based on some theoretical construct not necessarily related in any way
to reality."7 This analysis agrees with Professor Beck. It begins with a
detailed discussion of what water law "is" as a starting place to
introduce economic principles that show how people behave in the
face of legal restrictions or legal rights. That there are gaps in the
legal analysis of this article is a criticism of the present system: the
transaction costs created by an elite group (lawyers) force a new
4. Id.
5. See Smerdon, supra note 1, at 163.
6. RUBEN P. MENDEZ, INTERNATIONAL
GLOBALRELATIONS 13 (1992).
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7. Robert E. Beck, Assessment of the Role of the Social Sciences in Water Planningand
Management: Legal Systems and Their Impediments to Change, in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND

(Duane D. Baumann & Yacov Y. Haimes eds., 1988).
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generation of water lawyers to spend a lifetime intellectually wrangling
with the "is" instead of becoming forces for change.
This analysis takes the perspective of what "ought" to occur. What
principles underpin the codification of legal systems? How can microeconomic principles aid in understanding how individuals will behave
in a new system of water law? How might the law be changed to
reduce the amount of water wasted? The answer to these and other
questions raised in this article are not based on the exposition of the
status quo to minds that crave "understanding." Rather, the answers to
these questions are discovered by venturing beyond the last tick of the
clock.
This analysis is divided into three sections. The first section
explores the role of governments, particularly state governments, in
western water law. It begins with a brief historical look at government
involvement and the development of the prior appropriation system.
It then examines the structure of water markets and government
involvement in water allocation from a micro-economic perspective.
Section two, "Problems with the Present System," covers bureaucratic
supply issues, water rights uncertainty, high-transaction costs, and
offers a brief critique of "value integration" (building public interest
criteria into the present system).
Section three suggests some
solutions to the problems identified in section two. Specifically,
section three considers a water auction system, allowing users to
perfect water rights through conservation, and the need for state
systems to precisely define the rights to be transferred in terms of
measurement.
Changing an entrenched system of property law is a daunting task.
Therefore, I encourage readers to "dream" of what "could be." Law is
merely a system of words that tries to contemplate and replicate
human experiences. When it fails to change with the times, the times
must change it.
H. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN WESTERN WATER LAW
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Western water allocation began long before European settlement
of the West.! Spanish settlers and Native Americans populated the
western states and founded systems of water law long before settlement
from the eastern United States began. 9 This section examines some of
the historical aspects of water law in the western United States with
respect to the founding of the prior appropriation system. This
historical overview does not purport to be exhaustive, but rather is a
starting place to examine some fundamental assumptions of the prior
appropriation system and the governmental regimes that implement
8.

See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, A

HISTORY 4 (rev. ed. 2001).
9. See id.
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and support the system.
During the nineteenth century the federal government supported
settlement of the West as a means to bring stability to the region.
Under the spirit of manifest destiny, and in what is often referred to as
the largest wealth transfer in the history of the world, the federal
government literally gave land to anyone willing to move west and
work the land."° Also, the mining booms of the mid- to late nineteenth
century brought many to the West from the eastern United States.
The new settlers soon realized the West was particularly arid. The
availability of water was critical to the miners-considered the
architects of the prior appropriation system by many--and to
farmers." What was also apparent was the individualism of the settlers
and the fear of water speculation from large corporate conglomerates.
A rule of capture regarding water began to emerge. Therefore, one
who diverted water and put it to a beneficial use acquired a "use"
right.'2
Many commentators seem to ignore the assumptions regarding the
role of government when explaining the history of the West. Most
western state constitutions plainly suggest that the water resources
within the state's borders belong to the people of the state and are
therefore publicly held. 3 That private property rights exist is simply an
incomplete view of water law in the West. The institutional evolution
of state and federal support for the prior appropriation system is a
critical component in the operation of the system.
The progressive era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century appears to be the most important philosophical movement in
the history of western water law. The progressives of a century ago
attempted to accomplish their goals via "the transformation of a
decentralized, nontechnical, loosely organized society, where waste
and inefficiency ran rampant, into a highly organized, technical, and
centrally planned and directed social organization which could meet a
complex world with efficiency and purpose." 4 Water management
policy consisted of state funded reclamation projects. Hiram H.
10. The Desert Lands Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
11. A. DANTARLOCKET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 150 (4th ed. 1993).
12. See id. at 151-54.
13. See generally CAL. CONST. art. X, § 5 ("The use of all water now appropriated, or
that may hereafter be appropriated, for sale, rental, or distribution, is hereby declared
to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and control of the State, in the
manner to be prescribed by law."); COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 ("The water of every
natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."); MONT. CONsT.
art. IX, § 3, cl. 3 ("All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the
boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people and are
subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."); Wvo. CONST. art. I, §
31 ("Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of
diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state, which, in
providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved.").
14. SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EmCIENcY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT,

1890-1920, at 265 (1959).
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Chittenden, an engineer for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in an
1897 report to Congress, argued "only 'through the agency of the
General Government' would it be 'possible to secure the best
development'." 5 It was a common belief that the government's
purpose was to develop and manage water resources in the interest of
the public."
The progressives believed the involvement of the
government, particularly the federal government, was critical to the
development of water resources.
While the federal government's role in subsidizing water
development projects has largely waned, the assumptions regarding
the proper role of governments in water management persist. State
and local government institutions continue to manage and own water
rights and distribution networks in the western United States. 7 The
settlement of the West achieved marks that the architects of manifest
destiny probably could not have foreseen. Nearly all of the water in
the West is appropriated. This raises new questions regarding the
future evolution of western water law.
State institutions "originally evolved to support new appropriations
of water and to protect those appropriations once achieved."18 Now,
the same institutions created for the purpose of administering the
prior appropriation system are facing new institutional demands,
namely transferring water rights while continuing to protect vested
water use rights. Whether these institutions are properly equipped to
handle the transfer of water rights is a central component of this
analysis. Evaluating potential changes in the law, must therefore
include the notion that change must consider state and local
administration of the process.
State involvement in water use and management extends beyond
the administration of the prior appropriation system.
One
commentator suggests governmental water delivery organizations
provide "a vertical chain of services, including water supply, sewerage
services, and sewage and effluent treatment and disposal, as well as
provision of the local pipeline networks."19 Most commentators believe
local water districts' costs, including "expenses for local networks of
pipes and sewers, a major capital expenditure, [are] an inseparable
cost of the water supply."0 It is also argued that since a "district's water
supply is viewed as common property, no one can claim a legal or even
expectational right to a specific share of the proceeds."'
The
15. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 117.
16. Id. at 117-18.
17. Liza Grandia, Public Water Systems Need Commitment, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb. 4,
2002, at 12A.
18. Lee Brown et al., Water Reallocation, Market Proficiency, and Conflicting Social
Values, in WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION,
REALLOCATION, AND MARKETS 193 (Gary D. Weatherford ed., 1982).
19. NIcoLAS SPULBER & ASGHAR SABBAGHI, ECONOMICS OF WATER RESOURCES: FROM
REGULATION TO PRIVATIZATION 209 (2d ed. 1998).

20.
21.

Id. at 208.
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., InstitutionalPerspectiveson Water Policy and Markets, 81
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assumptions about the government's role in water delivery after
appropriation are critical to the proper functioning of a market for
water resources.
Thus, the history of the government's role in western water law
reveals two key assumptions: (1) state institutions are deemed
necessary to the functioning and capable administration of the prior
appropriation system in an age of full appropriation; 'and (2)
governmental water districts are the appropriate institutions to control
the delivery of the water supply. Both of these assumptions receive
thorough examination in this analysis.
B. MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE GOALS OF WATER LAW
This analysis discards the status quo of water law and instead
considers new methods for water allocation. The idea is to create a
system more responsive to the social opportunity cost of water .use.
Because the law enunciates general human assumption, it is critical to
start from the assumptions of the "ought" of the law. While
economists appear to use a scientific method of study, this analysis
assumes economics is really the study of human behavior. Studying
the manner in which individuals respond to incentives allows
economists to structure economies that maximize social efficiency. To
that end, this section rests on scholarly literature to* define the
principles of an effective system"of water law.
The first assumption future water law ought to consider is the
government's role in defining property rights. Property is commonly
viewed as a bundle of sticks, each stick being a right associated with
property.22 Rights restrict individuals' and institutions' behavior.
From a behavioral-economic viewpoint, the purpose of government is
to define precisely the quantity of water a holder is entitled to use.
Diversion, return flow, and other aspects of water use may complicate a
water law scholar's definition.
The second assumption is that the transfer of well-defined property
rights ought to proceed with a minimum of transaction costs. "The
goal for policymakers interested in promoting water markets should be
to eliminate the obstacles that institutions pose to long-distance
transfers while encouraging institutions to continue to play a role in
the promotion and facilitation of water markets."" The idea is that
"[t]he transaction costs for negotiation and execution of a sale should
be no greater than for an ordinary sale of a parcel of real property."2 4
Some transaction costs come from the difficulty in defining a water
right. This second assumption rests more squarely on the costs of the
externalities involved in water transfers, such as third party rights and
ecological concerns.
CAL. L. REv. 671, 732 (1993).
22. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
23. Thompson, supra note 21, at 701.
24. Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water
Resource Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 7, 15 (1983).

Issue 2

RE-WRITING WESTERN WATER LAW

A new system should take into account externalities that may not
be part of the private cost. Through administrative proceedings, the
present system protects third parties, the environment, and waste. "A
social measure of value, however, also takes into account impacts on
parties affected by the transaction who were not part of the price
negotiation process." 5 The current system protects others whom a
right transfer may damage. Theoretically, state policy should find an
optimal balance between "unrestricted markets which can result in
high third party costs and market restrictions which reduce third party
impacts. ,,26 In short, prices in a water market ought to reflect the
social value of water, and therefore, state policies ought to facilitate
incorporating external costs and benefits into the price of water
resources.
Third, the legal alteration of appropriation mechanisms is simply
not enough to facilitate the transition to a market system where users
face the marginal social cost of water use. The government must divest
itself of ownership and delivery of water systems and resources. The
government does not have the proper day-to-day financial incentives to
effectively manage delivery.
Economic literature includes many
examples of ineffective delivery of services by bureaucratic agencies,
which have no more than a modicum of political incentive to deliver
services efficiently. One commentator remarked:
The fundamental problem with public ownership-government
intervention in developing and managing water resources and supplyoriented policies-has been that government never has been able to
establish effective incentives for relevant agencies and customers alike
in order to globally optimize production and distribution of water
services
and place a value on these services representing opportunity
7
cost.2

Angus Duncan elaborated by describing governmental
involvement: "[b]oth the benefits to human communities and the
costs to other biota are products of conscious government policies to
encourage development that relies on direct and indirect subsidies
and public investments."2 8 A system which is founded on the premise
that governments ought to be involved in the delivery of water
resources may be the antithesis of potential Pareto optimality.
These goals theorize the purpose of the government in the area of
water law. Simply put, the governmental role in maximizing efficiency
is to define property rights, facilitate and remove barriers to the
exchange of property, divest itself of operating like a private firm in

25. Bonnie Colby Saliba et al., Do Water Market Prices Appropriately Measure Water
Values?, 27 NAT. RESOURCFSJ. 617, 620-21 (1987).
26. Bonnie G. Colby, Economic Impacts of Water Law--State Law and Water Market
Development in the Southwest, 28 NAT. RESOURcESJ. 721, 749 (1988).
27. SPULBER & SABBAGHI, supra note 19, at 192.
28. Angus Duncan, Of Time and the River, 16 F. FOR APPLIED RES. AND PUB. POL'Y 88,
91(2001).
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the market-place, and internalize externalities into the market for
water rights. These goals will underpin the remainder of this analysis.
The most fertile ground for change lies where goals derived from the
assumptions of the present system conflict.

m1. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM
A. BUREAUCRATIC SUPPLY
Government agencies deliver water to residential users." Those
agencies and operations that should continue in water delivery include
city water boards, water districts, and operations involving large out-ofbasin water transfers. The present system cannot guarantee water use
efficiency because institutions lack the economic incentives found in
the private sector. This section examines the incentive problems
drowning bureaucratic water supply organizations.
Discretionary budgets provide an example of why bureaucratic
supply is inefficient. Agencies typically have a budget allocation, which
relies on executive discretion.
One can assume that economic
efficiency would encourage executives to produce at minimum cost
with the intent to return the discretionary budget to their sponsors.'
Despite this goal, bureaucratic supply agencies seldom neglect to
spend their budgets.2 This example demonstrates how agencies
delivering water services do not face the same economic pressure as
private, corporate-owned agencies.
Second, bureaucratic agencies do not face competition in the
delivery of water services. In a competitive market, those firms that fail
to use their resources most efficiently are squeezed out of the market
by firms that do."
The lack of competition creates a negative
economic result. The profit motive on the other hand, provides
strong incentive for private firms to research and develop
technological innovation in water delivery, an incentive public
agencies do not face."
Third, bureaucratic agencies cannot value the benefits of new
technologies. A private firm can value the addition of new technology
via the addition to the bottom line. In a public firm, however, since
there is no profit from the sale of resources, there is no way to decide
whether new technologies will decrease or increase costs. Though
public firms may look at similar agencies in other jurisdictions, they
still must deal with valuation problems in order to determine whether

29. Grandia, supra note 17, at 12A.
30. DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POuCY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE

184-85 (3d. ed. 1999).
31.

Id. at 185.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 186.
34. Id. at 187.
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new technologies have actually proven beneficial elsewhere. 5
Finally, the inflexibility in civil service protections renders
bureaucratic agencies unresponsive to consumers. 6 The problem is
that human resource procedures within bureaucratic agencies ensure
continuity and insulation from political pressure and therefore inhibit
releasing employees that are performing inefficiently in an economic
sense. This problem is further complicated by fixed pay schedules that
drive the overqualified to leave the agency and those under-qualified
to remain. 7 Private firms have more control over their human
resources policy and therefore avoid that problem. 8 Thus the
separation of politics and administration arguably limits public
agencies' ability to effectively serve consumers."
These bureaucratic supply problems serve as an impetus for
privatization of water delivery to secure potential Pareto optimality.
One cannot ignore the role of institutions in the transition to a market
system because water institutions are not strictly economic entities
representing the pooled interests of their constituents.4" That a
market system could be successful without solving the problems of
bureaucratic supply is much ignored in the literature on the reform of
western water law and is critical to the transition to a water market
system. The issue is not the inclusion of institutions in the solution,
but rather reformation of the water delivery system to exclude
government market participation as part of a comprehensive
privatization and reform process.
B. WATER RIGHT UNCERTAINTY

A water right is a: right to use a certain amount of water.41 Several
requirements inherent in the prior appropriation system hinder the
definition of rights. Among these requirements are: a diversion, the
prohibition of waste,43 and application to beneficial use. 44 "In order for
market participants to estimate the value of a water right they must be
able to form expectations about the benefits associated with owning
the right and the degree to which the right is protected from
impairment by others." Uncertainty of rights dissuades individuals to
pay for that right when it is unclear what legal implications and

35.

WEIMER & VINING, supra note 30, at 187.
36. Id. at 187-88.
37. Id. at 188.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Thompson, supra note 21, at 678.
41. SeeJanet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVrL. L. 919 (1998).
42. See Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928
(Idaho 1974).
43. Neuman, supra note 41, at 920.
44. Id.
45. Colby, supra note 26, at 726.
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restrictions may accompany the purchase."'
This section examines some of the uncertainties caused by the
prior appropriation system that impede the transfer of water rights.
First, waste causes uncertainty as to how much water a person actually
uses beneficially. Waste is not an objectively defined concept, and case
law reveals a general uncertainty over what constitutes waste.4 When a
potential transfer is pending, determining whether the current user is
wasting water complicates valuation. Courts are supposed to rely on
only actual, historic, beneficial use when confirming or decreeing a
water right amount.48 A general lack of clarity with regard to waste
predominates, and as a result "[i]f the behavior does not shock the
conscience, it is allowed." 9 Since wasteful practices go clearly beyond
uses encompassed under acceptable water use-often in effect for
many years and in the modern era inefficient-they are difficult to
challenge under case law.'0
Second, "beneficial use" in western water law looks to the courts to
decide whether a use is efficient.5 This scenario eliminates the role of
the market system, arguably the best means of allocating scarce
resources. The market ought to decide which uses are beneficial, and
the law should allow all uses.
There are several reasons why the beneficial use requirement
causes uncertainty in terms of the right a user actually holds.
Beneficial use is a dynamic concept and varies with the conditions. 5 2 It
therefore can be said that beneficial use is a fact-specific and
circumstantial concept. It is this dynamism that creates uncertainty.
Since the definition of beneficial use is constantly evolving in an
attempt to "keep with the times," present beneficial use is not
necessarily future beneficial use. Thus, a potential transferee may have
difficulty ascertaining whether the continuation of the water right
constitutes the present "beneficial use."
This fact-specific determination therefore means that at any
particular point in time, an individual's water rights may be uncertain
and condemned merely because a fact-finder-using a non-static
definition of beneficial use-determines that the use is not beneficial.
Thus, defining a beneficial use is not the enumeration and
understanding of any particular set of principles. Rather, it is the
whim of the not-yet-convened jury who determines "beneficial" based
on subjective perspectives. Leaving valuation of a property right to
fact-finder discretion is problematic.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
1983).
53.
1935).

Saliba, supra note 25, at 621.
See Nueman, supra note 41, at 933-46.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 947.
Id. at 925.
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir.
See, e.g., Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
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Third, the requirement of a diversion also complicates the
definition of a water right. Prior appropriation doctrines almost
universally demand that water be diverted for a right to be perfected.
Water lost via diversion is a highly adjudicated issue. Water loss caused
by the proverbial "leaky ditch" problem or evaporation is not part of
the amount of water a user is actually using. As a result, it is difficult to
ascertain which part of the total quantity of water diverted is applied to
a beneficial use. This measurement problem makes it difficult for
parties to a transfer to ascertain what quantity of historic beneficial use
is actually being transferred. This problem is compounded by a system
that creates disincentives for water conservation in diversion methods
by not allowing the innovator to capture economic benefits associated
with innovation or requiring users to divert efficiently. Courts and
agencies disfavor decreasing the amount of water a particular user
diverts or requiring innovative conservation improvements (i.e. lining
ditches or microsprinklers) due to the expense of improving water
efficiency,
unless the users' practices are not within the community
54
norm.
This section briefly describes some of the uncertainty regarding
the valuation of a water right, which may cause problems to both the
transferee and transferor of a water right in a contractual sale. In
order to facilitate, or at least accommodate water rights transfers, the
law must overcome the barriers to defining a right; this is critical to the
functioning of a market for water rights. Put simply, "It]he doctrine of
beneficial use, with its implications of judicial determination of need
and non-use, in effect increases the uncertainty of title to rights in
water, and therefore reduces their marketability.""' The next section
of this analysis focuses on third-party barriers to water transfers as
another set of legal doctrines that creates right uncertainty and
transfer barriers.
C. HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS, UNCERTAINTY: THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS

The right to use water contains a duty not to injure other
appropriators.6 When a transfer occurs, a third-party has a right to
challenge the transfer on grounds that it will injure the third-party's
water right."' A water right, therefore, is uncertain in the sense that
litigation may or may not occur as the result of a transfer from an
unknown and potentially large number of water users. There is no
doubt that third-party
effects, which economists refer to as
"externalities,""8 must play a role in the future of water law. In the
present system, however, protection of third-party rights serves as a
significant barrier to water right transfers.
54. Thompson, supra note 21, at 683.
55. Timothy D. Tregarthen, The Marketfor Property Rights in Water, 6 DENV.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 363, 369 (1976).
56. Thompson, supra note 21, at 703.
57. Id. at 704.
58. See RH. COASE, THEFIRM, THEMARKET, AND THELAw 23-24 (1998).
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A market system that fails to take third-party effects into account
may not produce a socially efficient mechanism in the delivery of water
resources. A recent movement in economics questions proposed
market systems where the economic architects presumed "frictionless
markets."" A frictionless market is one where the costs of trading
property are essentially zero.6 In the market for water resources, that
assumption completely overlooks reality.
Water right transfers
encompass substantial transaction costs, largely in the legal
proceedings, to determine third-party effects. To that end, this section
examines the nature of these third-party costs.
An informed economic viewpoint would suggest the "proper"
functioning of a market system demands removal of transaction costs.
This viewpoint ignores social efficiency and argues for a system that
protects the rights of those who want to transfer their rights at the
expense of those who wish to retain them. Each water transaction has
third-party effects. Reducing transaction costs and failing to consider
third-party effects means the price of water will not reflect the true
social cost of the water right. "If state policies do not cause buyers and
sellers to account for external values that may be affected by a transfer,
then a proposed transfer may be beneficial to the buyer and seller
even though it is actually inefficient from an overall social
perspective."6 ' Thus, the goal for future water law reformers ought to
be not just the exclusion of third-party effects from transaction costs to
transfers, but the inclusion of third-party effects into the price of water
rights.
The cost of the legal and administrative proceedings for
transferring water rights, and the length of the process, can be
substantial. 2 The expense of statutory transfer proceedings deters
many small or short-term trades.0 In Colorado and New Mexico,
various-sized transfers have cost from a few hundred dollars to as much
as $50,000.6 In fact, "the statutory transfer process can in a typical case
add twenty percent or more onto the cost of small purchases."65 The
average processing time for a transfer ranges from approximately six
months to a year and a half.6" As a result, these delays often deter
short-term transfers and thereby prevent some local regions from
adapting to droughts and immediate water needs.67
Restrictions on third-party rights are governed by return flow rules.
Specifically, an appropriator may not transfer water rights if doing so
would disadvantage a return flow appropriator.6 Barton Thompson
59.
60.
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64.
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66.
67.
68.
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explains:
Appropriators generally have no right to their return flow; water that
returns to a stream is available for appropriation by downstream users
exactly as if it had never been diverted. To protect those downstream
users, all western states have "no injury" rules. These "no injury" rules
prohibit changes in water use that would harm downstream
69 users by
altering the amount, timing, or quality of the return flow."
These rules exist to protect the vested rights of appropriators
downstream. Third-party effects represent substantial costs to those
wishing to transfer water rights, and as suggested above, may deter
many transactions.
This section represents both a justification for, and an indictment
of the present system. As a justification, this section argues it is
important in terms of social efficiency to include third-party effects in
the market for water rights. The present system does this via a costly
judicial proceeding. As an indictment, this section argues the present
system imposes the cost of third-party effects on the party transferring
a property right, and thereby substantially affects the significance of
market activity in water rights transfers. Removing the uncertainty of
third-party effects in defining a water right, theoretically, seems to be
the answer to removing transaction costs while preserving third-party's
vested rights.
D. CRITIQUE OF VALUE INTEGRATION

This section considers the integration of non-monetary values into
the present system of prior appropriation as a means to achieve
environmental goals. Public interest not only adds to the complexity
of the present system, but also may harm vested water use rights, a
concept antithetical to the development of the market system. Since
bureaucratic agencies face only political, and not financial impacts
from public interest decisions, they may force more conservation than
is socially demanded in the face of social cost. In a market system,
agencies and non-profits could raise money and purchase rights to
maintain instream flows and lakes. Since these agencies would
confront the social cost of water in a competitive market, the resultant
amount of conservation would be socially efficient.
The addition of public interest criteria fails to achieve the
structural conditions for optimum efficiency for several reasons. First,
inclusion of public interest criteria is contrary to the development of a
market system where agencies and individuals face the marginal social
cost of water use rights when making a purchase decision. Expanding
the substantive issues administrative agencies and courts must consider
with regard to the transfer of water rights-including the
environment, the local community, and the public interest-will

69. Thompson, supra note 21, at 703.
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complicate matters and raise costs. An increase in transaction costs
would decrease the incentive to shift to a better use, and encourage
maintenance of the status quo. One author agreed:
One of the primary economic effects of public interest criteria can be
to create substantial uncertainty and additional risk for water market
part cipants. This is particularly likely when public interest language
is inc uded in state statutes regarding water transfers but no
definition of what constitutes the public interest is provided. The
lack of specific public interest criteria makes transfer applicants
vulnerable to unpredictable difficulties and costs in implementing a
transfer."
"[W]hen government allocates rights on the basis of vague notions
of merit or public interest," the result seems to be that "applicants
invest enormous resources in hiring high-priced lawyers to put on a
largely meaningless show-meaningless because the criteria for the
public interest are necessarily so elusive.
Interminable and
unmanageable procedures, inconsistent results, and corruption are
also likely."7 ' Thus, in an attempt to protect the environment, these
new criteria reinforce the status quo by heightening transfer costs, all
at the expense of the water right holder.
Second, adding public interest criteria calls into question all
previous vested rights and therefore adds greater uncertainty to the
transfer process. Arguably, the result is a constitutional taking. And
although in its purest form the public trust doctrine could serve to
rescind or modify a vested right, it would be non-compensable, similar
to takings under navigation servitude. 73 Nonetheless, this would call
current rights into question. Thus, those parties involved in a transfer
would have difficulty ascertaining the existence of the rights in
question. Because what constitutes a public interest is relatively
indefinable, it could include any number of special interests.7 . The
uncertainty new bureaucratic micromanagement could create would
lock in the status quo and then define away vested rights holders'
current rights under uncertain definitions of what is in the public
interest. The true public interest ought to be a competitive market for
water rights transfers, where use is defined by willingness-to-pay.
Adding public interest criteria increases what Coase would call the
"friction" in market transactions. At the same time, the pool of vested
rights theoretically would shrink without compensation. Because of
antiquated views of the market economy, many environmentalists
assume that a properly operating market excludes considerations of
70.
71.
72.
73.
Water
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This assumption,
conservation and environmental protection.
however, is patently false. A properly operating market without
friction and with billions of wasted tax dollars of bureaucratic supply of
water via tax dollars partially regained, would allow for the socially
efficient amount of conservation. The effect of public interest criteria
is to introduce greater inefficiency into the system.
As such,
codification of further substantive criteria in the prior appropriation
system should be rejected as it reifies the status quo and prevents
change. The true path of environmental conservation is to make water
users face the true social cost of water use, which includes the future
value of environmental problems.
IV. THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET SYSTEM: SOLUTIONS
A. DEFINING CONSUMPTIVE USE

Defining what rights a transferee will actually gain in purchasing a
water right is critical. From diversion to return flow, much water is lost
either by use or escape from the system. The amount of water diverted
does not equal the amount of water used, which does not equal the
amount of water returned. From the time water is diverted, each step
in the process (i.e., diversion, use, return) involves loss from the
system. To correct this system of loss, state governments must define
the actual quantity of each water right outside of the transfer process
such that the price of the water right is not affected by the cost of
determining the right itself.
Economists have long believed that the key to altering behavior is
market creation and definition. To that end, a new system of water law
ought to distinguish the elements that constitute a water right. In the
present system, a water right holder must divert the water, use it, and
at least in the early days, decide whether to return it (to perhaps allow
downstream appropriation) . The first step in the process is to define
the historical use of each water right. The size of this project is
particularly daunting but critical.
The only reasonably effective cure for the problems presented by the
no-injury rule is to requantify appropriative rights according to the
amount of water that each appropriator can consume rather than the
amount each can divert, thereby eliminatiVA the need to determine

return flow each time a right is transferred.
The problem may be that "states would need to calculate the
return flows of all water rights immediately in order to quantify the
consumptive rights-a tremendous administrative chore that no state
would want to undertake without a compelling reason."" While this
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undertaking may seem especially large, it is relatively small compared
to the prospect of constructing the physical water infrastructure of a
generation ago. With the same type of "can-do" attitude, a legislature
could order state agencies to define the historical use of water rights.
The purpose of this new quantification is to determine what each
party has to transfer, which involves three critical amounts: quantity
diverted, quantity used, and quantity returned. A potential purchaser
of rights would then understand the duties owed to surrounding water
right holders, diminishing transaction costs necessary to satisfy any
third-party challenges.
B. ALLOW DIVERSION IMPROVEMENTS
The diversion represents a separate part of a water right required
to perfect a right. The quantity of water diverted, minus the quantity
of water used represents the "delivery" portion of a water right. The
present system encourages water users to either "use it or lose it."
Thus, modifications to delivery that increase efficient diversion do not
reward the appropriator because, as the logic goes, it was never his to
begin with. Legislatures ought to allow for efficiency improvements to
become distinct water rights. This could take place either by dividing
the rights into two rights-delivery rights and use rights-or simply
recognizing improvements as water rights.
The right holder
responsible for increasing efficiency would have the burden of
quantifying the amount of water saved. A state agency could certify
private engineering companies capable of measuring water using
recognized scientific techniques and equipment as water accounting
firms.
The principle that market creation arises via market definition is
critical in situations where no market exists. Recognizing diversion as
an independent right would open up a market for water diversion.
Private firms would likely contract with farmers who would rush to
install pipelines. All of the seepage and evaporation could be turned
into income. Private firms could charge for construction, monitoring,
and metering the quantity of water saved through new diversion
technologies.
Facilitating market transaction of these savings from diversion is
more difficult than one may think. Questions about specific priority
dates and diversions would arise. The new set of regulations could
allow for transfers between parties without the necessity of a diversion.
The party who is purchasing the right, probably a municipality (or new
water company, see below) would already have a means to divert
upstream. The portion of water purchased would retain its priority
date. This would turn water saved from diversion into a commodity
that could be sold. To add to this solution, return flows could follow
the same procedure. If an appropriator can show a more efficient
means of returning the water to the stream, then she ought to be able
to capture the savings.
This option would not work in concert with the first option,
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defining historic use. The concept of historic use is the reason savings
in diversion and return flows cannot become water rights. The idea is
that an appropriator is taking water from a stream and returning a
certain amount to the stream in the present system, the present system
encourages this to maintain a water right. Allowing for diverters to
capture the economic profits associated with less waste is an incentive
that would allow for transfers. These transfers would be better than
new appropriations because they would retain the original priority
date.
C. WATER AUcTiONS

A water auction would require condemnation of all present uses
before an auction could take place. Assume the state condemns all
water rights and pays an estimated market value to each water right
holder. The state could then return a pro rata percentage of the
auction proceeds minus the cost of condemning rights to each water
right holder. Once the state estimates the total volume of water
available, it would hold a closed-seal bidding process where each water
user bids on the amount of water he or she wants to use. Since no user
would be aware of another user's bid, each bid would presumably
move toward the actual value of the use to the bidder. The sale would
convey right to use water, not the right to divert it. Any return flows
would have to be measured and could be re-auctioned during regular
auction cycles. Each new water user could divert, as he had in years
past. But the amount of water diverted, not the amount beneficially
used, would be the measure of rights.
A water auction under this proposal presumably would require the
abolition of the prior appropriation system. The right to use water
would be separated from the outdated rule of "capture," a logical
alternative for a resource difficult to "capture" in the traditional sense.
Large and wealthy municipalities would obviously have greater ability
to place large bids, and numerous transfers would put water rights into
many new hands. Consequently, the family farmer could potentially
lose out. Perhaps other areas of the country are better able to produce
agricultural commodities. The best way to find out where products in
a national economy ought to be produced is to have each user face the
actual social cost of water resources. The "next-best-use" is the one
which successfully bid for the water right.
This option would function well with the privatization of water
resource delivery. If private companies distributed water (particularly
municipal water), they could buy water rights via auction. The
company that best estimates its profitability, as reflected in its bid,
would succeed. Water prices would reflect the cost of purchasing the
water against the next best use and the delivery of the water to a user;
consumers would face the actual social cost of providing water; thirdparty effects, such as environmental concerns, would be included in
the auction system. Those wishing to protect an instream flow could
purchase it. Those who wanted drought protection could purchase it,
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by over-buying water rights.
Finally, taking the element of priority date and damage to other
users out of the system would turn water into a commodity and would
facilitate transfer. Each user would have an incentive to conserve
water because that which is conserved could be sold. Return flows
would offer a secondary market for water, which could be purchased
on an on-going basis. Ignoring the role that institutions play would be
catastrophic to a market system. Since government owned delivery
agencies have few incentives, the bureaucratic agencies would distort
the true price of water, and thus could damage the system. Implicit in
an auction system is that bids will reflect the actual social value of each
individual water user's contemplated use. State run institutions cannot
accurately measure the value of the actual contemplated use, since
their cost-benefit ratios often depend on the tax base and a host of
other considerations unrelated to the actual marginal social cost of
water. If state institutions for water delivery were privatized, then the
auction system would function nicely.
D. THE GOVERNMENTS MUST GET OUT OF THE WATER BUSINESS

Government delivery of water resources must end. Government
agencies are incapable of efficiently delivering water services. If
governments continue to use tax dollars to subsidize water services,
individual consumers will not face the social cost of water and will tend
to over-consume. Since government organizations respond to political
pressure and are responsible only to their constituency, their central
purpose becomes to provide services at the lowest cost. As a result,
pricing mechanisms do not reflect the true social cost of providing
such services.
The barriers to the transition from government to private
ownership are entrenched in western thinking and stem mostly from
fear of larger corporations. " [ M] ost water users believe that water is of
sufficient importance and complexity that its delivery cannot be
trusted to commercial institutions even when they are regulated."78
This fear, which founded the prior appropriation system, developed in
an age when the anti-trust laws had not even been contemplated,
much less codified. In the present system, the question of distributing
power between individuals and corporations is a question appropriate
for an anti-trust forum. Any implicit doctrinal assumptions in water
law that seek to influence the outcome of this distributive rights
question ought to be rejected.
One view of what would happen if the government were to sell off
its resources is the following:
In order to promote effective competition in the water industry along
with privatization, the ownership, modernization, and development
of the transmission main systems needs to be severed from the
78. Thompson, supra note 21, at 694.
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integrated water supply and wastewater services provided by other
private and competitive firms. Put differently, the unified water
supply and wastewater companies would provide water of various
qualities in a competitive market, but the pipeline systems would be
owned by separate, private water transmission companies. In this
context, we could view the separately controlled water transmission
systems as new options in the organization of water supply and use.
The separation could involve the creation of one or more pipeline
companies that would invest in pipeline networks and then rent the
distribution installations to water supply and wastewater treatment
companies, or directly charge the customer, depending on the
quantity and quality of water services and the area. Such a separation
of services would promote effective competition in the supply of
uality-graded water services and efficiency in managing the
dstribution networks.
While multiple firms may compete in
treatment and the supply of water of various qualities and provide
sewage services, other regulatedfirms would invest in the transmission79
main systems and rent them to the water supply companies.
This would allow for the functioning and operation of systems that
could deliver water in various qualities to users independent of
political boundaries, and thus better reflect the social cost of water.
State governments, obviously, would need to regulate the industry to a
varying degree.
The nuances of water privatization, such as those arising in Britain,
are beyond the scope of this document. It is important to realize that

the transition to a market system involves more than the transferring
of rights within the prior appropriation system. A true "market"
system is one where each user faces the marginal social cost of each
additional unit of use. Allowing governments to continue to deliver
water services that shield users from the actual marginal social costs of
staying in the shower five minutes longer, or of planting an acre of
high-water use landscaping, prevents the transition to a market system,
which could better determine efficiency than a group of planners in a
government office building.
V. CONCLUSION
The West has changed radically since the creation of the prior
appropriation doctrine. The prior appropriation doctrine guaranteed
survival to the original settlers cut off from food, information, and
other staples of life of which their geographic isolation deprived them.
In the modern day, the best water law is that which facilitates the
privatization of the water system so each individual user, both irrigator
and municipal customer, feels the price impacts of each additional
unit of water used. In this system, one can evaluate for himself how
much water is best used in the face of social cost.
This analysis identified three main changes that could better
allocate water resources. Two of them, clarifying vested rights and
allowing for the perfection of conserved water into use rights, are
79.
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probably the most politically acceptable solutions. The auction system
would require the overthrow of the prior appropriation doctrine, and
therefore would be less palatable politically at present. It is fairly clear
that the price of water in the West, where water is becoming more and
more scarce, is probably too low for the average user. It seems
demand is fairly inelastic at such low prices; otherwise, the average
consumptive use per user would probably be falling. That it is
increasing demonstrates that the actual social cost of water is greater
than the private cost of providing it.
When each consumer of water faces the actual social cost of water
brought about by the negotiation of competing uses, water use will
decrease. Only when the water law of the West is rewritten to include
the new reality will the saying in the rotunda of the Colorado Capitol
ring true, for a whole new generation of westerners.

